- Mobilization of all affected sectors of the maritime community
- Developing public-private partnerships that promote long-term solutions at sea and ashore
- Global and sustainable deterrence based on the rule of law
About the OBP Independent Assessment
This independent assessment was conducted to describe and evaluate the extensive international and regional efforts to address piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The study was conducted in an atmosphere of increased visibility and awareness of the economic and human cost of piracy, as well as growing concern amongst stakeholders over the utility and direction of regional and international counter-piracy efforts. To date, these efforts have largely focused on mitigating the symptoms of piracy, which has been successful in limited areas, but there are multiple costs associated with ongoing efforts. It would be advantageous for planning efforts - which currently focus on mitigation and containment - to shift planning efforts towards deterrence and suppression. Similarly, the study recommends that resources shift from individual protection towards investment in collective solutions.
A 2-page summary of the entire assessment can be downloaded by clicking the links below:
How to use the interactive version of the independent assessment
Description: In order to achieve the most efficient use of naval forces present in the high risk area, it is important that all naval forces involved in counter-piracy operations coordinate and de-conflict their efforts.
Assessment:The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The meetings are held in Bahrain every six weeks and are co-chaired on a rotational basis by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO, and EUNAVFOR. Since the beginning in 2008, representatives from militaries in 27 countries, international organizations, the maritime industry and several governments have joined the meetings.
Description: Overall counter-piracy measures would benefit from not only the large three naval forces in the area (CMF, EU NAVFOR, NATO) but also the inclusion of independent deployers from regional countries in international efforts.
Assessment: China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Yemen have deployed ships and/or aircraft to combat piracy in the region. The ability of these independent and regional forces to enjoy the same situational awareness with the larger coalition forces is hampered by their lack of reasonable means to share classified information. Other issues included a lack of convoy coordination by countries outside the SHADE mechanism that led to inefficient use of assets. This has been improved with expanded interaction through the SHADE mechanism and improved information sharing. China, India, and Japan have also agreed to carry out more effective coordination by establishing a convoy coordination working group as part of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism.
Description: In order to secure a long-term political mandate and to ensure adequate force generation, a commitment from stakeholder nations to deploy naval force in high risk areas is needed.
Assessment: A presentation by the EU NAVFOR Chief of Staff given in London in October 2011 shows that nations have not committed adequate assets for the 2012 force flow. Extension of EU NAVFOR and NATO mandates beyond 2012 are still under consideration.
Description: The ability of naval patrol forces to arrest and detain suspected Somali Pirates.
Assessment: According to the 'Jack Lang Report' from January 2011, more than 90% of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released without being prosecuted. The impunity resulting from such “catch and release” practices tends to make the risk-reward ratio for the pirates negligible and to encourage piracy as well as put navy personnel at greater risk.
Description:
The creation of a unified system for collecting and sharing evidence between naval forces, law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities would be of great benefit and support the prosecution of a larger number of pirates.
Assessment: Collection of evidence by naval forces is of high quality, and evidence collection guidelines have now become part of BMP for ship owners and seafarers. However, the UN Secretary-General notes in a report from October 2011 that there is a need to expand and formalize the mechanism for evidence sharing. The SecGen report also notes that information sharing and coordination among a large variety of international naval forces through the SHADE mechanism has improved and that there is a greater level of cooperation between the navies, shipowners and international law enforcement.
The UN Security Council, in resolution 1976, reiterates "its call upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with resolution 1950 (2010) and applicable international law, including human rights law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia...."
Piracy Containment
Description: In order to achieve the most efficient use of naval forces present in the high risk area, it is important that all naval forces involved in counter-piracy operations coordinate and de-conflict their efforts.
Assessment:The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The meetings are held in Bahrain every six weeks and are co-chaired on a rotational basis by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO, and EUNAVFOR. Since the beginning in 2008, representatives from militaries in 27 countries, international organizations, the maritime industry and several governments have joined the meetings.
Description: Overall counter-piracy measures would benefit from not only the large three naval forces in the area (CMF, EU NAVFOR, NATO) but also the inclusion of independent deployers from regional countries in international efforts.
Assessment: China, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Yemen have deployed ships and/or aircraft to combat piracy in the region. The ability of these independent and regional forces to enjoy the same situational awareness with the larger coalition forces is hampered by their lack of reasonable means to share classified information. Other issues included a lack of convoy coordination by countries outside the SHADE mechanism that led to inefficient use of assets. This has been improved with expanded interaction through the SHADE mechanism and improved information sharing. China, India, and Japan have also agreed to carry out more effective coordination by establishing a convoy coordination working group as part of the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism.
Description: In order to secure a long-term political mandate and to ensure adequate force generation, a commitment from stakeholder nations to deploy naval force in high risk areas is needed.
Assessment: A presentation by the EU NAVFOR Chief of Staff given in London in October 2011 shows that nations have not committed adequate assets for the 2012 force flow. Extension of EU NAVFOR and NATO mandates beyond 2012 are still under consideration.
Description: It is important that Flag States and the collective shipping industry demonstrate unity with international naval forces. Through vessel compliance with long-range identification and tracking to improve communication with navies, naval forces will have expanded capacity to protect a larger number of ships in the high risk area. Similarly, universal agreement amongst Flag States to allow vessel protection detachments on-board World Food Program and other vulnerable vessels has the potential to increase flexibility of warships engaged in WFP ship protection to assist with other vulnerable vessels in the region.
Assessment: LRIT/AIS Cooperation: The Maritime Safety Committee established an Information Distribution Facility (IDF) to provide LRIT information to security forces, which navies have said is invaluable information. However, according to IMO Circular Letter 3164 “because the IDF is not used by all Member States, naval forces do not have a complete picture of ship activity in the area.”
VPDs on WFP and vulnerable ships: Flag States believed to be resistant to VPDs. International shipping associations submitted a proposal seeking a UN force of armed military guards to be deployed onboard merchant ships.
Description: The ability of naval patrol forces to arrest and detain suspected Somali Pirates.
Assessment: According to the 'Jack Lang Report' from January 2011, more than 90% of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released without being prosecuted. The impunity resulting from such “catch and release” practices tends to make the risk-reward ratio for the pirates negligible and to encourage piracy as well as put navy personnel at greater risk.
Description: To be effective, external communications initiatives should target all audiences in a coherent manner through international media, emphasizing various angles including the human cost (to seafarers and ordinary Somalis); successful Somali anti-piracy efforts (ex. Eyl); and progress and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: There is limited international coverage of Somali piracy; much competition for international media attention (famine and the Al-Shabaab). Many stories repeat already established explanations and angles while de-emphasizing the human cost of piracy to sefarers and ordinary Somalis, and the positive efforts some Somali communities have made to expel pirates. At the same time, stories about the successes and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts rarely make it to mainstream media. The GCPCS website launched in early October 2011 is an important step towards promoting the goals of the Contact Group and others involved in trying to solve the problem of piracy.
Description:
The creation of a unified system for collecting and sharing evidence between naval forces, law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities would be of great benefit and support the prosecution of a larger number of pirates.
Assessment: Collection of evidence by naval forces is of high quality, and evidence collection guidelines have now become part of BMP for ship owners and seafarers. However, the UN Secretary-General notes in a report from October 2011 that there is a need to expand and formalize the mechanism for evidence sharing. The SecGen report also notes that information sharing and coordination among a large variety of international naval forces through the SHADE mechanism has improved and that there is a greater level of cooperation between the navies, shipowners and international law enforcement.
The UN Security Council, in resolution 1976, reiterates "its call upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with resolution 1950 (2010) and applicable international law, including human rights law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia...."
Description: Experience has shown that application of self-defense measures onboard vessels can and will make a significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy.Self-defense measures include conducting full risk assessments of vessels prior to entering high risk areas and implementing appropriate measures accoding to the risk asessment. The most authoritative list of precautions and guidelines can be found in the Best Management Practices booklet although each vessel may require more tailored measures. It is important that all ships implement necessary self-protection.
Assessment: A presentation by the EU NAVFOR Chief of Staff given in London in October 2011 shows that BMP compliance was 80% in July 2011, up from around 30% in January the same year. However, naval forces reported through IMO circular letter number 3164 that an unacceptably high proportion of ships are not registered with MSCHOA, are not reporting to UKMTO, and show no visible deterrent measures.
Description: It is important that Flag States and the collective shipping industry demonstrate unity with international naval forces. Through vessel compliance with long-range identification and tracking to improve communication with navies, naval forces will have expanded capacity to protect a larger number of ships in the high risk area. Similarly, universal agreement amongst Flag States to allow vessel protection detachments on-board World Food Program and other vulnerable vessels has the potential to increase flexibility of warships engaged in WFP ship protection to assist with other vulnerable vessels in the region.
Assessment: LRIT/AIS Cooperation: The Maritime Safety Committee established an Information Distribution Facility (IDF) to provide LRIT information to security forces, which navies have said is invaluable information. However, according to IMO Circular Letter 3164 “because the IDF is not used by all Member States, naval forces do not have a complete picture of ship activity in the area.”
VPDs on WFP and vulnerable ships: Flag States believed to be resistant to VPDs. International shipping associations submitted a proposal seeking a UN force of armed military guards to be deployed onboard merchant ships.
Description: Full sharing of piracy information entails coordination between ship owners, international naval forces and private maritime security teams in the area in order to most effectively address the threat of piracy and to combat it. Timely completion of thorough incident reports is essential to effective information collection about piracy in the high risk area.
Assessment: There is currently no requirement or effective incentive to ensure information sharing between private security and navies. Shipowners and flag states do not have policies in place requiring full reporting on private security teams’ activities in theatre. However, individual companies often share relevant information with navies on a case-by-case basis.
Description: In order to ensure successful prosecutions, industry must cooperate with Law Enforcement to ensure access to and preservation of forensic evidence, ensure the reporting of all piracy attacks and incidents by private security teams, and facilitate access to crews to allow them to testify against pirates.
Assessment: The latest version of BMP includes a section to encourage crews to provide witness statements related to the crime, recommended best practices and protocols for the preservation of evidence or other physical clues and guidelines for ship owners to ensure the preservation of evidence on ships or the integrity of the crime scene. However, there are no standardized rules requiring the reporting of incidents at sea by private security teams, and there are still challenges associated with getting crew members to provide testimony: “In most of the States in which prosecutions have been initiated, the legal system is based on common law and requires testimony in person. That requirement is a major obstacle to a swift trial either because the victims do not wish to go to lengths to give evidence, are afraid, or their employers may not allow them to testify.”
Description: Studies have shown that piracy costs the shipping and maritime industries billions of dollars every year. The vast majority of this expense is used on mitigation measures such as ship hardening, insurance, re-routing and private security teams. While not a traditional role for private companies, contributing to collective long-term solutions might lead to lower costs in the long run, as the root causes of piracy are treated and the need for mitigation measures decreases.
Assessment: By and large, industry has not contributed to the collective solutions that have been established to encourage their participation, such the Contact Group Trust Fund and other Trust Funds established by organizations such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. There is some thought that industry could be further encouraged to contribute to collective solutions if they were allowed to participate more equally in the planning and decision-making process.
Revision 4 of the Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy states that ‘The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices (BMP) contained in this booklet is to assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in the High Risk Area. This would include all vessels in the high risk area registering and coordinating with naval forces (MSCHOA and UKMTO) and following recommended actions based on a full risk assessment.
Piracy Containment
Description: Experience has shown that application of self-defense measures onboard vessels can and will make a significant difference in preventing a ship becoming a victim of piracy.Self-defense measures include conducting full risk assessments of vessels prior to entering high risk areas and implementing appropriate measures accoding to the risk asessment. The most authoritative list of precautions and guidelines can be found in the Best Management Practices booklet although each vessel may require more tailored measures. It is important that all ships implement necessary self-protection.
Assessment: A presentation by the EU NAVFOR Chief of Staff given in London in October 2011 shows that BMP compliance was 80% in July 2011, up from around 30% in January the same year. However, naval forces reported through IMO circular letter number 3164 that an unacceptably high proportion of ships are not registered with MSCHOA, are not reporting to UKMTO, and show no visible deterrent measures.
Description: It is important that Flag States and the collective shipping industry demonstrate unity with international naval forces. Through vessel compliance with long-range identification and tracking to improve communication with navies, naval forces will have expanded capacity to protect a larger number of ships in the high risk area. Similarly, universal agreement amongst Flag States to allow vessel protection detachments on-board World Food Program and other vulnerable vessels has the potential to increase flexibility of warships engaged in WFP ship protection to assist with other vulnerable vessels in the region.
Assessment: LRIT/AIS Cooperation: The Maritime Safety Committee established an Information Distribution Facility (IDF) to provide LRIT information to security forces, which navies have said is invaluable information. However, according to IMO Circular Letter 3164 “because the IDF is not used by all Member States, naval forces do not have a complete picture of ship activity in the area.”
VPDs on WFP and vulnerable ships: Flag States believed to be resistant to VPDs. International shipping associations submitted a proposal seeking a UN force of armed military guards to be deployed onboard merchant ships.
Description: Full sharing of piracy information entails coordination between ship owners, international naval forces and private maritime security teams in the area in order to most effectively address the threat of piracy and to combat it. Timely completion of thorough incident reports is essential to effective information collection about piracy in the high risk area.
Assessment: There is currently no requirement or effective incentive to ensure information sharing between private security and navies. Shipowners and flag states do not have policies in place requiring full reporting on private security teams’ activities in theatre. However, individual companies often share relevant information with navies on a case-by-case basis.
Description: In order to ensure successful prosecutions, industry must cooperate with Law Enforcement to ensure access to and preservation of forensic evidence, ensure the reporting of all piracy attacks and incidents by private security teams, and facilitate access to crews to allow them to testify against pirates.
Assessment: The latest version of BMP includes a section to encourage crews to provide witness statements related to the crime, recommended best practices and protocols for the preservation of evidence or other physical clues and guidelines for ship owners to ensure the preservation of evidence on ships or the integrity of the crime scene. However, there are no standardized rules requiring the reporting of incidents at sea by private security teams, and there are still challenges associated with getting crew members to provide testimony: “In most of the States in which prosecutions have been initiated, the legal system is based on common law and requires testimony in person. That requirement is a major obstacle to a swift trial either because the victims do not wish to go to lengths to give evidence, are afraid, or their employers may not allow them to testify.”
Description: It is imperative for relevant bodies to work together to develop a collective understanding of required action to streamline efforts and maximize effectiveness.
Assessment: Working Group 1, led by the UK, has established a needs and requirements matrix for regional capacity building, including from 2011 also operational capacity building through the Djibouti Code of Conduct and international navies. Working Group 2 has established a 'legal toolbox' containing checklists, guidelines, templates, and compilations of relevant legal documents relating to prosecution of suspected pirates. However, no overall matrix exists listing the initiatives and resources required to comprehensively address piracy.
Description: Studies have shown that piracy costs the shipping and maritime industries billions of dollars every year. The vast majority of this expense is used on mitigation measures such as ship hardening, insurance, re-routing and private security teams. While not a traditional role for private companies, contributing to collective long-term solutions might lead to lower costs in the long run, as the root causes of piracy are treated and the need for mitigation measures decreases.
Assessment: By and large, industry has not contributed to the collective solutions that have been established to encourage their participation, such the Contact Group Trust Fund and other Trust Funds established by organizations such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. There is some thought that industry could be further encouraged to contribute to collective solutions if they were allowed to participate more equally in the planning and decision-making process.
Description: To be effective, external communications initiatives should target all audiences in a coherent manner through international media, emphasizing various angles including the human cost (to seafarers and ordinary Somalis); successful Somali anti-piracy efforts (ex. Eyl); and progress and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: There is limited international coverage of Somali piracy; much competition for international media attention (famine and the Al-Shabaab). Many stories repeat already established explanations and angles while de-emphasizing the human cost of piracy to sefarers and ordinary Somalis, and the positive efforts some Somali communities have made to expel pirates. At the same time, stories about the successes and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts rarely make it to mainstream media. The GCPCS website launched in early October 2011 is an important step towards promoting the goals of the Contact Group and others involved in trying to solve the problem of piracy.
Revision 4 of the Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy states that ‘The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices (BMP) contained in this booklet is to assist ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in the High Risk Area. This would include all vessels in the high risk area registering and coordinating with naval forces (MSCHOA and UKMTO) and following recommended actions based on a full risk assessment.
Description: In order to ensure precise data and evidence collection for international forces to properly evaluate the risk to vessels transiting the high risk area, accurate and timely reports of attacks and violence must be submitted by shipmasters and onboard private security forces to the appropriate bodies.
Assessment: In August 2011, the world's three largest flag states (Bahamas, Panama, Marshall Islands) signed a declaration committing to increased reporting on the human cost of piracy. The IMB is developing a protocol for reporting information shared with them by flag states. Several agencies provide live information about pirate attacks. However, currently there is no official protocol for reporting by security teams to anyone other than the client on incidents at sea.
Description: To gain a complete understanding of the effect of piracy on seafarers transiting the high risk area, additional research is needed to understand the needs of seafarers before, during and after incidents of piracy.
Assessment: The Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Program ( MPHRP) is compiling information from first-hand interviews and meetings with seafarers involved in piracy incidents. Oceans Beyond Piracy is conducting a study in the Philippines on the long-term impacts of piracy on seafarers and their families. Seamen’s Church Institute developed a multi-year project exploring the clinical assessment and treatment of piracy attack survivors.
Description: Standardized training in major seafaring nations, particularly for those seafarers transiting the high risk area, would increase awareness of the risk of piracy as well as preparedness of seafarers in responding to a pirate attack.
Assessment:
Training:·The Government of the Philippines provides a regular anti-piracy training program for seafarers and is making this a requirement for all Filipino seafarers. In addition, non-governmental advocacy groups such as the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme are looking at ways to better standardize this training, and to expand these efforts to other nations.
Awareness: BMP4 is available for free online and the American Bureau of Shipping developed a “quick reference guide” for onboard use. BMP4 will be translated into several languages in order to reach as widely as possible to the maritime community, according to NATO Shipping Centre.
Description: While the specific impacts of piracy incidents are not yet known with absolute certainty, support to seafarers following an incident would help them to readjust to life after an attack. Support centers for seafarers in major ports as well as in home countries would additionally promote communication with and support to seafarer family members.
Assessment: The Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Program is developing a model to provide support to seafarers and their families to help them deal with the physical and psychological trauma of piracy before, during, and after an incident. The Seamen’s Church Institute provides a wide spectrum of support services—chaplaincy, legal aid, and continuing maritime education; however, these services are not specifically targeted towards piracy response.
A high degree of information and coordination would assist in promoting a safe working environment for seafarers transiting through high risk areas. In order to improve access to full information on the risks of transiting pirated waters, flag States, ship owners, and security teams need to provide complete and transparent information on pirate attacks and actions.
Piracy Containment
Description: In order to ensure precise data and evidence collection for international forces to properly evaluate the risk to vessels transiting the high risk area, accurate and timely reports of attacks and violence must be submitted by shipmasters and onboard private security forces to the appropriate bodies.
Assessment: In August 2011, the world's three largest flag states (Bahamas, Panama, Marshall Islands) signed a declaration committing to increased reporting on the human cost of piracy. The IMB is developing a protocol for reporting information shared with them by flag states. Several agencies provide live information about pirate attacks. However, currently there is no official protocol for reporting by security teams to anyone other than the client on incidents at sea.
Description: To gain a complete understanding of the effect of piracy on seafarers transiting the high risk area, additional research is needed to understand the needs of seafarers before, during and after incidents of piracy.
Assessment: The Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Program ( MPHRP) is compiling information from first-hand interviews and meetings with seafarers involved in piracy incidents. Oceans Beyond Piracy is conducting a study in the Philippines on the long-term impacts of piracy on seafarers and their families. Seamen’s Church Institute developed a multi-year project exploring the clinical assessment and treatment of piracy attack survivors.
Description: It is important that Flag States and the collective shipping industry demonstrate unity with international naval forces. Through vessel compliance with long-range identification and tracking to improve communication with navies, naval forces will have expanded capacity to protect a larger number of ships in the high risk area. Similarly, universal agreement amongst Flag States to allow vessel protection detachments on-board World Food Program and other vulnerable vessels has the potential to increase flexibility of warships engaged in WFP ship protection to assist with other vulnerable vessels in the region.
Assessment: LRIT/AIS Cooperation: The Maritime Safety Committee established an Information Distribution Facility (IDF) to provide LRIT information to security forces, which navies have said is invaluable information. However, according to IMO Circular Letter 3164 “because the IDF is not used by all Member States, naval forces do not have a complete picture of ship activity in the area.”
VPDs on WFP and vulnerable ships: Flag States believed to be resistant to VPDs. International shipping associations submitted a proposal seeking a UN force of armed military guards to be deployed onboard merchant ships.
Description: Full sharing of piracy information entails coordination between ship owners, international naval forces and private maritime security teams in the area in order to most effectively address the threat of piracy and to combat it. Timely completion of thorough incident reports is essential to effective information collection about piracy in the high risk area.
Assessment: There is currently no requirement or effective incentive to ensure information sharing between private security and navies. Shipowners and flag states do not have policies in place requiring full reporting on private security teams’ activities in theatre. However, individual companies often share relevant information with navies on a case-by-case basis.
Description: To be effective, external communications initiatives should target all audiences in a coherent manner through international media, emphasizing various angles including the human cost (to seafarers and ordinary Somalis); successful Somali anti-piracy efforts (ex. Eyl); and progress and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: There is limited international coverage of Somali piracy; much competition for international media attention (famine and the Al-Shabaab). Many stories repeat already established explanations and angles while de-emphasizing the human cost of piracy to sefarers and ordinary Somalis, and the positive efforts some Somali communities have made to expel pirates. At the same time, stories about the successes and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts rarely make it to mainstream media. The GCPCS website launched in early October 2011 is an important step towards promoting the goals of the Contact Group and others involved in trying to solve the problem of piracy.
Description: Standardized training in major seafaring nations, particularly for those seafarers transiting the high risk area, would increase awareness of the risk of piracy as well as preparedness of seafarers in responding to a pirate attack.
Assessment:
Training:·The Government of the Philippines provides a regular anti-piracy training program for seafarers and is making this a requirement for all Filipino seafarers. In addition, non-governmental advocacy groups such as the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme are looking at ways to better standardize this training, and to expand these efforts to other nations.
Awareness: BMP4 is available for free online and the American Bureau of Shipping developed a “quick reference guide” for onboard use. BMP4 will be translated into several languages in order to reach as widely as possible to the maritime community, according to NATO Shipping Centre.
Description: While the specific impacts of piracy incidents are not yet known with absolute certainty, support to seafarers following an incident would help them to readjust to life after an attack. Support centers for seafarers in major ports as well as in home countries would additionally promote communication with and support to seafarer family members.
Assessment: The Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Program is developing a model to provide support to seafarers and their families to help them deal with the physical and psychological trauma of piracy before, during, and after an incident. The Seamen’s Church Institute provides a wide spectrum of support services—chaplaincy, legal aid, and continuing maritime education; however, these services are not specifically targeted towards piracy response.
A high degree of information and coordination would assist in promoting a safe working environment for seafarers transiting through high risk areas. In order to improve access to full information on the risks of transiting pirated waters, flag States, ship owners, and security teams need to provide complete and transparent information on pirate attacks and actions.
Description: Counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia would benefit from coordinating the multitude of media and outreach activities to produce a unified message regarding piracy activities and counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: Working Group 4 of the Contact Group is in charge of improving diplomatic and public information efforts on all aspects of piracy. There have been increased efforts by individual stakeholders to discuss strategies and share information and de-conflict messages, but overall efforts could benefit from the establishment of a requirements matrix similar to the one WG1 uses to coordinate capacity building programs. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia launched a website in October 2011 to serve as a 'cyber secretariat' and as the public portal to the Contact Group's work.
Description: To be effective, an internal communications initiative should focus on reaching Somalis in a coherent manner through Somali media, and inform the Somali population of the negative effects and long term implications of piracy by giving a voice to Somalis themselves and involve a wide range of stakeholders, such as clerics, elders, women's groups, youth groups and government officials.
Assessment: The UNODC has announced the launch of a media and outreach strategy called 'Somalia Beyond Piracy', which seeks to dis-incentivize piracy among Somalis though a set of targeted anti-piracy messages and the inclusion of locals in public forums and advocacy caravans to visit local regions and communities. The UN Political Office for Somalia has facilitated a communication project carried out in Somali communities with funding from the Contact Group Trust Fund.
Stories within Somali still often focus on piracy as a valid response to illegal fishing and dumping. The issue of illegal fishing and dumping was addressed in a report by the UN Secretary-General in October 2011, which found that there is no conclucsive studies on the extent of these activities. Various organizations and agencies have used local radio stations to broadcast anti-piracy messages, but this effort is not coordinated or de-conflicted.
Description: To be effective, external communications initiatives should target all audiences in a coherent manner through international media, emphasizing various angles including the human cost (to seafarers and ordinary Somalis); successful Somali anti-piracy efforts (ex. Eyl); and progress and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: There is limited international coverage of Somali piracy; much competition for international media attention (famine and the Al-Shabaab). Many stories repeat already established explanations and angles while de-emphasizing the human cost of piracy to sefarers and ordinary Somalis, and the positive efforts some Somali communities have made to expel pirates. At the same time, stories about the successes and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts rarely make it to mainstream media. The GCPCS website launched in early October 2011 is an important step towards promoting the goals of the Contact Group and others involved in trying to solve the problem of piracy.
The goal of messaging initiatives is to create public awareness and understanding of the nature of Somali piracy. For audiences inside Somalia, this includes making piracy an unappealing career path, and for audiences outside of Somalia it includes accurate reporting of piracy attacks and the human and economic cost of piracy to the world as well as covering the progress and challenges of Somali and international counter-piracy initiatives.
Piracy Containment
Description: Counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia would benefit from coordinating the multitude of media and outreach activities to produce a unified message regarding piracy activities and counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: Working Group 4 of the Contact Group is in charge of improving diplomatic and public information efforts on all aspects of piracy. There have been increased efforts by individual stakeholders to discuss strategies and share information and de-conflict messages, but overall efforts could benefit from the establishment of a requirements matrix similar to the one WG1 uses to coordinate capacity building programs. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia launched a website in October 2011 to serve as a 'cyber secretariat' and as the public portal to the Contact Group's work.
Description: To better address the root causes of Somali piracy, international counter-piracy forces would benefit from gaining a more comprehensive understanding of Somali perspectives on piracy and motivations for becoming pirates through for example public surveys and forums.
Assessment: There have not been conducted large-scale surveys on Somali views and beliefs of piracy. However, various organizations have carried out localized forums and focus groups to better understand Somali viewpoints.
Description: To be effective, an internal communications initiative should focus on reaching Somalis in a coherent manner through Somali media, and inform the Somali population of the negative effects and long term implications of piracy by giving a voice to Somalis themselves and involve a wide range of stakeholders, such as clerics, elders, women's groups, youth groups and government officials.
Assessment: The UNODC has announced the launch of a media and outreach strategy called 'Somalia Beyond Piracy', which seeks to dis-incentivize piracy among Somalis though a set of targeted anti-piracy messages and the inclusion of locals in public forums and advocacy caravans to visit local regions and communities. The UN Political Office for Somalia has facilitated a communication project carried out in Somali communities with funding from the Contact Group Trust Fund.
Stories within Somali still often focus on piracy as a valid response to illegal fishing and dumping. The issue of illegal fishing and dumping was addressed in a report by the UN Secretary-General in October 2011, which found that there is no conclucsive studies on the extent of these activities. Various organizations and agencies have used local radio stations to broadcast anti-piracy messages, but this effort is not coordinated or de-conflicted.
Description: Full sharing of piracy information entails coordination between ship owners, international naval forces and private maritime security teams in the area in order to most effectively address the threat of piracy and to combat it. Timely completion of thorough incident reports is essential to effective information collection about piracy in the high risk area.
Assessment: There is currently no requirement or effective incentive to ensure information sharing between private security and navies. Shipowners and flag states do not have policies in place requiring full reporting on private security teams’ activities in theatre. However, individual companies often share relevant information with navies on a case-by-case basis.
Description: To be effective, external communications initiatives should target all audiences in a coherent manner through international media, emphasizing various angles including the human cost (to seafarers and ordinary Somalis); successful Somali anti-piracy efforts (ex. Eyl); and progress and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: There is limited international coverage of Somali piracy; much competition for international media attention (famine and the Al-Shabaab). Many stories repeat already established explanations and angles while de-emphasizing the human cost of piracy to sefarers and ordinary Somalis, and the positive efforts some Somali communities have made to expel pirates. At the same time, stories about the successes and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts rarely make it to mainstream media. The GCPCS website launched in early October 2011 is an important step towards promoting the goals of the Contact Group and others involved in trying to solve the problem of piracy.
The goal of messaging initiatives is to create public awareness and understanding of the nature of Somali piracy. For audiences inside Somalia, this includes making piracy an unappealing career path, and for audiences outside of Somalia it includes accurate reporting of piracy attacks and the human and economic cost of piracy to the world as well as covering the progress and challenges of Somali and international counter-piracy initiatives.
Description: Regional countries coordinate to determine what is necessary to build capacity for regionally-based and –run counter-piracy programs, particularly the development of a regional coast guard force.
Assessment: The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCC) work to Increase regional Maritime Situational Awareness capacity and interagency cooperation. Working Group 1 of the CGPCS has taken the lead in developing a needs and requirements matrix for regional capacity building efforts.
Description: Regional nations are attempting to build an information network to pass piracy information between the Djibouti Code Signatory States based upon three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) in Sana'a, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and a network of National Focal Points in all Signatory States and other States to which the Code is open for signature.
Assessment: The three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) became operational in the first half of 2011. Since then the network of ISCs and their sub-regional National Focal Points has been joined through the Djibouti Code of Conduct Information Sharing Network. The network has also been used to gather and share piracy-related information. However, increased engagement is required with some participating nations to increase cooperation within and across participating nations and the effectiveness of their National Focal Points. On 11 November 2011 an agreement was signed by the three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) set up under the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Singapore-based ReCAAP ISC to establish standard operating procedures for communicating and exchanging piracy-related information and will result in a major expansion of the reporting area of such incidents.
Description: In order to create a more unified and comprehensive counter-piracy programme and build the regional capacity to suppress piracy, it will be essential for regional initiatives to coordinate with one another and for respective efforts to coalesce.
Assessment: While the Working Group One Needs Assessment Matrix and the Djibouti Code of Conduct have been identified as the guiding documents for development of regional maritime capability, there are several parallel plans which have been developed by NATO and EU nations, or agencies within those nations, that need to be incorporated into one comprehensive plan to avoid duplication of effort. The TRADE (Training Awareness and De-confliction) mechanism has been initiated to start this process, but has focused primarily on coordinating western efforts in the region. There is not yet a mechanism to de-conflict the myriad regional organizations that have announced plans or initiatives to cooperate against piracy including: The Indian Ocean Region - Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the Eastern and Southern Africa - Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Regional Action Plan, the Arab League, the African Union, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the East African Standby Brigade and others.
Description: In order to create a sustainable counter-piracy framework, leadership for regional maritime efforts must be developed from within the region iteself. Key areas include operational coordination of naval operations, information sharing and regional capacity building.
Assessment: The precondition for regional leadership is the successful de-confliction of regional intiatives. The second phase, which has not yet begun, could include the eventual transfer of the convening and coordination functions of existing, but western-led initiatives such as TRADE, SHADE, MSC-HoA, UKMTO and others to regional organizations.
Description: International naval forces present in the high risk area could be supplemented by regional states bolstering their own coast guard and naval forces, maximizing efficiency and effectiveness of the collection of international forces in the vicinity.
Assessment: There are plans to enhance regional Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) capability in 2012. However, some regional legislation continues to restrict their effectiveness. The Djibouti Code of Conduct and other organizations have been working with states to encourage multi-agency approaches to address piracy through workshops and training.
If the counter-piracy effort is to create the preconditions for lasting and sustainable solutions, the countries in the region must build their own capacities for handling the challenges in the area of maritime security. This applies to Somali and its different domestic regions, as well as for the neighboring countries. In particular the building of coastguard capacities in the region to enable the countries in the region to improve their ability to exercise traditional maritime authority, thus enabling them to curb piracy independently is of great importance.
Piracy Containment
Description: Regional countries coordinate to determine what is necessary to build capacity for regionally-based and –run counter-piracy programs, particularly the development of a regional coast guard force.
Assessment: The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCC) work to Increase regional Maritime Situational Awareness capacity and interagency cooperation. Working Group 1 of the CGPCS has taken the lead in developing a needs and requirements matrix for regional capacity building efforts.
Description: Regional nations are attempting to build an information network to pass piracy information between the Djibouti Code Signatory States based upon three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) in Sana'a, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, and a network of National Focal Points in all Signatory States and other States to which the Code is open for signature.
Assessment: The three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) became operational in the first half of 2011. Since then the network of ISCs and their sub-regional National Focal Points has been joined through the Djibouti Code of Conduct Information Sharing Network. The network has also been used to gather and share piracy-related information. However, increased engagement is required with some participating nations to increase cooperation within and across participating nations and the effectiveness of their National Focal Points. On 11 November 2011 an agreement was signed by the three Information Sharing Centres (ISCs) set up under the IMO-led Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Singapore-based ReCAAP ISC to establish standard operating procedures for communicating and exchanging piracy-related information and will result in a major expansion of the reporting area of such incidents.
Description: In order to create a more unified and comprehensive counter-piracy programme and build the regional capacity to suppress piracy, it will be essential for regional initiatives to coordinate with one another and for respective efforts to coalesce.
Assessment: While the Working Group One Needs Assessment Matrix and the Djibouti Code of Conduct have been identified as the guiding documents for development of regional maritime capability, there are several parallel plans which have been developed by NATO and EU nations, or agencies within those nations, that need to be incorporated into one comprehensive plan to avoid duplication of effort. The TRADE (Training Awareness and De-confliction) mechanism has been initiated to start this process, but has focused primarily on coordinating western efforts in the region. There is not yet a mechanism to de-conflict the myriad regional organizations that have announced plans or initiatives to cooperate against piracy including: The Indian Ocean Region - Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), the Eastern and Southern Africa - Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Regional Action Plan, the Arab League, the African Union, the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the East African Standby Brigade and others.
Description: The CGPCS offers participation to any country or international organization making a tangible contribution to the counter-piracy effort, or to any country significantly affected by piracy off the coast of Somalia. Other relevant stakeholders may participate in the meetings of CGPCS and its four Working Groups as observers.
Assessment: Although formed as a separate institution from the United Nations, the Contact Group still emphasizes state-centric leadership and membership focused on individual nations, regional organizations of nations, and international organizations. Other select stakeholders are offered observer status. There is also a perceived geographic imbalance with Europe and North America heavily represented in both overall membership and leadership positions.
Description: In order to create a sustainable counter-piracy framework, leadership for regional maritime efforts must be developed from within the region iteself. Key areas include operational coordination of naval operations, information sharing and regional capacity building.
Assessment: The precondition for regional leadership is the successful de-confliction of regional intiatives. The second phase, which has not yet begun, could include the eventual transfer of the convening and coordination functions of existing, but western-led initiatives such as TRADE, SHADE, MSC-HoA, UKMTO and others to regional organizations.
Description: International naval forces present in the high risk area could be supplemented by regional states bolstering their own coast guard and naval forces, maximizing efficiency and effectiveness of the collection of international forces in the vicinity.
Assessment: There are plans to enhance regional Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) capability in 2012. However, some regional legislation continues to restrict their effectiveness. The Djibouti Code of Conduct and other organizations have been working with states to encourage multi-agency approaches to address piracy through workshops and training.
Description: To achieve sustained suppression and deterrence of piracy, Somali capacity to apprehend, try and incarcerate suspected criminals would need to be strengthened. Additionally, the development of a Somali coast guard to monitor the coast would both prevent illegal fishing and discourage acts of piracy.
Assessment: UNODC and UNDP are working to develop rule of law capacity in Somalia, including building prisons and training judges and prosecutors. The Somali Roadmap outlines the development of effective maritime security and counter-piracy policy and legislation in Puntland and Somaliland by May 2012.A coast guard is being developed in Somaliland by an independent firm with some pirates apprehend; it is, however, limited by lack of funds and capacity. There are plans to develop a Puntland coast guard, but so far with little progress.
If the counter-piracy effort is to create the preconditions for lasting and sustainable solutions, the countries in the region must build their own capacities for handling the challenges in the area of maritime security. This applies to Somali and its different domestic regions, as well as for the neighboring countries. In particular the building of coastguard capacities in the region to enable the countries in the region to improve their ability to exercise traditional maritime authority, thus enabling them to curb piracy independently is of great importance.
Description: To better address the root causes of Somali piracy, international counter-piracy forces would benefit from gaining a more comprehensive understanding of Somali perspectives on piracy and motivations for becoming pirates through for example public surveys and forums.
Assessment: There have not been conducted large-scale surveys on Somali views and beliefs of piracy. However, various organizations have carried out localized forums and focus groups to better understand Somali viewpoints.
Description: Somali governance developed and strengthened to facilitate effective enforcement of laws, including amendeding domestic codes to officially prohibit and criminalize acts of piracy in accordance with international standards, as well as declaring an Exclusive Economic Zone for Somali waters according to UNCLOS to enable enforcement of Somali waters.
Assessment: Strong resistance in Puntland’s government against criminalizing piracy without including illegal fishing indicates that it will be a challenge to fully update Somali legal codes in accordance with international definitions. Somalia has “critically out of date criminal and procedural codes and a shortage of trained judges and other legal professionals,” according to the UN Security Council. The ‘Somalia End of Transistion’ roadmap includes the planned establishment of a Somali EEZ by the end of 2011 as well as enacting of anti-piracy legislation by May 2012.
Description: To achieve sustained suppression and deterrence of piracy, Somali capacity to apprehend, try and incarcerate suspected criminals would need to be strengthened. Additionally, the development of a Somali coast guard to monitor the coast would both prevent illegal fishing and discourage acts of piracy.
Assessment: UNODC and UNDP are working to develop rule of law capacity in Somalia, including building prisons and training judges and prosecutors. The Somali Roadmap outlines the development of effective maritime security and counter-piracy policy and legislation in Puntland and Somaliland by May 2012.A coast guard is being developed in Somaliland by an independent firm with some pirates apprehend; it is, however, limited by lack of funds and capacity. There are plans to develop a Puntland coast guard, but so far with little progress.
Description: In order for Somalia to focus on challenges such as piracy, internal stability and reconciliation is needed between regions, clans and communities to promote working together towards common goals.
Assessment: The Kampala Process facilitates coordination between the regions, but is limited to counter-piracy issues. The Somali Roadmap signed by TFG, Puntland, Galmudug, and other organizations on September 6, 2011, agreeing to coordinated efforts, including reconciliation efforts is a promising step towards Somali reconciliation.
It is widely believed that the solution to piracy must be found ashore within Somalia. Given Somalia's economic and political status, the country will need contributions from other countries to be able to implement land-based long-term solutions such as a Somali coast guard and alternative livelihoods projects to offer young Somalis jobs that are unrelated to piracy. At the same time, it is important that the Somali authorities become even more engaged in the fight against piracy and in the long run develop the capabilities to deter their population from becoming pirates.
Piracy Containment
Description: To better address the root causes of Somali piracy, international counter-piracy forces would benefit from gaining a more comprehensive understanding of Somali perspectives on piracy and motivations for becoming pirates through for example public surveys and forums.
Assessment: There have not been conducted large-scale surveys on Somali views and beliefs of piracy. However, various organizations have carried out localized forums and focus groups to better understand Somali viewpoints.
Description: Somali governance developed and strengthened to facilitate effective enforcement of laws, including amendeding domestic codes to officially prohibit and criminalize acts of piracy in accordance with international standards, as well as declaring an Exclusive Economic Zone for Somali waters according to UNCLOS to enable enforcement of Somali waters.
Assessment: Strong resistance in Puntland’s government against criminalizing piracy without including illegal fishing indicates that it will be a challenge to fully update Somali legal codes in accordance with international definitions. Somalia has “critically out of date criminal and procedural codes and a shortage of trained judges and other legal professionals,” according to the UN Security Council. The ‘Somalia End of Transistion’ roadmap includes the planned establishment of a Somali EEZ by the end of 2011 as well as enacting of anti-piracy legislation by May 2012.
Description: Suspected pirates may be prosecuted by any willing state under universal jurisdiction. However, in order to do so, piracy and related maritime crimes must be criminalized under domestic law in all countries who must also ensure that relevant international treaties and conventions are adopted.
Assessment: A compilation of countries that have criminalized piracy under their domestic laws can be found here. However, the UN Security Council has repeatedly "noted with concern....that the domestic law of a number of States lacks provisions criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for effective criminal prosecution of suspected pirates" and reaffirmed the importance of national prosecution of suspected pirates for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia."
Description: To achieve sustained suppression and deterrence of piracy, Somali capacity to apprehend, try and incarcerate suspected criminals would need to be strengthened. Additionally, the development of a Somali coast guard to monitor the coast would both prevent illegal fishing and discourage acts of piracy.
Assessment: UNODC and UNDP are working to develop rule of law capacity in Somalia, including building prisons and training judges and prosecutors. The Somali Roadmap outlines the development of effective maritime security and counter-piracy policy and legislation in Puntland and Somaliland by May 2012.A coast guard is being developed in Somaliland by an independent firm with some pirates apprehend; it is, however, limited by lack of funds and capacity. There are plans to develop a Puntland coast guard, but so far with little progress.
Description: To be effective, an internal communications initiative should focus on reaching Somalis in a coherent manner through Somali media, and inform the Somali population of the negative effects and long term implications of piracy by giving a voice to Somalis themselves and involve a wide range of stakeholders, such as clerics, elders, women's groups, youth groups and government officials.
Assessment: The UNODC has announced the launch of a media and outreach strategy called 'Somalia Beyond Piracy', which seeks to dis-incentivize piracy among Somalis though a set of targeted anti-piracy messages and the inclusion of locals in public forums and advocacy caravans to visit local regions and communities. The UN Political Office for Somalia has facilitated a communication project carried out in Somali communities with funding from the Contact Group Trust Fund.
Stories within Somali still often focus on piracy as a valid response to illegal fishing and dumping. The issue of illegal fishing and dumping was addressed in a report by the UN Secretary-General in October 2011, which found that there is no conclucsive studies on the extent of these activities. Various organizations and agencies have used local radio stations to broadcast anti-piracy messages, but this effort is not coordinated or de-conflicted.
Description: To be effective, external communications initiatives should target all audiences in a coherent manner through international media, emphasizing various angles including the human cost (to seafarers and ordinary Somalis); successful Somali anti-piracy efforts (ex. Eyl); and progress and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts.
Assessment: There is limited international coverage of Somali piracy; much competition for international media attention (famine and the Al-Shabaab). Many stories repeat already established explanations and angles while de-emphasizing the human cost of piracy to sefarers and ordinary Somalis, and the positive efforts some Somali communities have made to expel pirates. At the same time, stories about the successes and challenges of international counter-piracy efforts rarely make it to mainstream media. The GCPCS website launched in early October 2011 is an important step towards promoting the goals of the Contact Group and others involved in trying to solve the problem of piracy.
Description: In order for Somalia to focus on challenges such as piracy, internal stability and reconciliation is needed between regions, clans and communities to promote working together towards common goals.
Assessment: The Kampala Process facilitates coordination between the regions, but is limited to counter-piracy issues. The Somali Roadmap signed by TFG, Puntland, Galmudug, and other organizations on September 6, 2011, agreeing to coordinated efforts, including reconciliation efforts is a promising step towards Somali reconciliation.
It is widely believed that the solution to piracy must be found ashore within Somalia. Given Somalia's economic and political status, the country will need contributions from other countries to be able to implement land-based long-term solutions such as a Somali coast guard and alternative livelihoods projects to offer young Somalis jobs that are unrelated to piracy. At the same time, it is important that the Somali authorities become even more engaged in the fight against piracy and in the long run develop the capabilities to deter their population from becoming pirates.
Description: Suspected pirates may be prosecuted by any willing state under universal jurisdiction. However, in order to do so, piracy and related maritime crimes must be criminalized under domestic law in all countries who must also ensure that relevant international treaties and conventions are adopted.
Assessment: A compilation of countries that have criminalized piracy under their domestic laws can be found here. However, the UN Security Council has repeatedly "noted with concern....that the domestic law of a number of States lacks provisions criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for effective criminal prosecution of suspected pirates" and reaffirmed the importance of national prosecution of suspected pirates for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia."
Description: There is widespread agreement that piracy is a problem whose long-term solution lies on land, however, in the short to medium term, those involved in piracy must be prosecuted and punished for their crimes. While International law does not oblige countries to prosecute suspected pirates, it is ultimately only countries that can bring pirates to justice.
Assessment: ·1011 pirates were held for prosecution or convicted as of June 2011, of which 917 (91%) were held by regional countries and 94 (9%) were held by out-of-region countries, according to the UNODC. However, according to the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Piracy, Jack Lang “…more than 90 per cent of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released without being prosecuted.”
Description: According to many piracy experts and governments, it is preferable to prosecute and incarcerate pirates in the region where they are captured and come from. In order for this to be successful, it is important to support increased regional capacity for regional countries to prosecute and build prison capacity through coordinated programs.
Assessment: UNODC and UNDP have programs to increase regional and local Somali capacity to prosecute and incarcerate. However, more funding is needed to finish the expansion of new prison spaces in Somalia as well as build judicial institutions in Somali and regional countries.There is a reluctance by regional authorities within Somali to cooperate. For example, Somaliland authorities only accept piracy suspects or convicts originating from Somaliland, which is a very limited number, according to the report by the UN Secretary General from June 2011. Moreover, UNODC reported that 60 pirates had been released from prison in Somaliland after a bribe was paid in 2011, according to a report by the UN Secretary General from October 2011. In November 2011, another two pirates were reportedly released from prison in Berbera, Somaliland, after a bribe was paid.
Description: Somali maritime piracy has developed into a sophisticated business model with large-scale logistics networks to supply equipment to pirate gangs as well as ensuring that ransoms are distributed to the ‘investors’ based in Somalia and abroad. In order to effectively disrupt and dismantle the pirate business model, it is necessary to prosecute those who plan, finance and supply pirate operations. By targeting a smaller, more concentrated group of pirate leaders, the pirate enterprise is weakened more efficiently than through pursuit of “rank and file” or lower rung pirates who are more easily replaced.
Assessment: The US has indicted two suspected pirate negotiators. One was apprehended in Somalia (Puntland) and the other was arrested when he tried to enter the US. Working Group 5 of the CGPCS was established in July 2011 with the aim of coordinating international efforts to identify and disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers. However, there is still a list of known pirate leaders who have not been apprehended.
Description: Under current international lawit is possible charge suspected pirates with the conspiracy to commit piracy based on the possession of piracy-related equipment and paraphernalia. Prosecuting suspected pirates on charges of conspiracy would enable the international community to incarcerate a much larger number of pirates than is currently the case.
Assessment: In the vast majority of cases, international naval forces have to release suspected pirates because of lack of political and/or prosecutorial will to prosecute based on conspiracy or equipment. Moreover, EU NAVFOR's Chief of Staff has disputed the ability to prosecute for conspiracy based on pirate paraphernalia by comparing it with imprisoning a law-abiding sports car driver because he has the capacity to speed. In addition, there is currently a lack of prison capacity in the region, further limiting the possibility of prosecuting suspected pirates who are not 'caught in the act'.
The current long-term focus for the international community is to build capacity in Somalia to imprison pirates that are convicted in regional nations and to ensure fair and efficient prosecution and imprisonment of pirates in Somalia.
Piracy Containment
Description: Suspected pirates may be prosecuted by any willing state under universal jurisdiction. However, in order to do so, piracy and related maritime crimes must be criminalized under domestic law in all countries who must also ensure that relevant international treaties and conventions are adopted.
Assessment: A compilation of countries that have criminalized piracy under their domestic laws can be found here. However, the UN Security Council has repeatedly "noted with concern....that the domestic law of a number of States lacks provisions criminalizing piracy and/or procedural provisions for effective criminal prosecution of suspected pirates" and reaffirmed the importance of national prosecution of suspected pirates for combating piracy off the coast of Somalia."
Description: There is widespread agreement that piracy is a problem whose long-term solution lies on land, however, in the short to medium term, those involved in piracy must be prosecuted and punished for their crimes. While International law does not oblige countries to prosecute suspected pirates, it is ultimately only countries that can bring pirates to justice.
Assessment: ·1011 pirates were held for prosecution or convicted as of June 2011, of which 917 (91%) were held by regional countries and 94 (9%) were held by out-of-region countries, according to the UNODC. However, according to the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Piracy, Jack Lang “…more than 90 per cent of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released without being prosecuted.”
Description: The ability of naval patrol forces to arrest and detain suspected Somali Pirates.
Assessment: According to the 'Jack Lang Report' from January 2011, more than 90% of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released without being prosecuted. The impunity resulting from such “catch and release” practices tends to make the risk-reward ratio for the pirates negligible and to encourage piracy as well as put navy personnel at greater risk.
Description:
The creation of a unified system for collecting and sharing evidence between naval forces, law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities would be of great benefit and support the prosecution of a larger number of pirates.
Assessment: Collection of evidence by naval forces is of high quality, and evidence collection guidelines have now become part of BMP for ship owners and seafarers. However, the UN Secretary-General notes in a report from October 2011 that there is a need to expand and formalize the mechanism for evidence sharing. The SecGen report also notes that information sharing and coordination among a large variety of international naval forces through the SHADE mechanism has improved and that there is a greater level of cooperation between the navies, shipowners and international law enforcement.
Description: According to many piracy experts and governments, it is preferable to prosecute and incarcerate pirates in the region where they are captured and come from. In order for this to be successful, it is important to support increased regional capacity for regional countries to prosecute and build prison capacity through coordinated programs.
Assessment: UNODC and UNDP have programs to increase regional and local Somali capacity to prosecute and incarcerate. However, more funding is needed to finish the expansion of new prison spaces in Somalia as well as build judicial institutions in Somali and regional countries.There is a reluctance by regional authorities within Somali to cooperate. For example, Somaliland authorities only accept piracy suspects or convicts originating from Somaliland, which is a very limited number, according to the report by the UN Secretary General from June 2011. Moreover, UNODC reported that 60 pirates had been released from prison in Somaliland after a bribe was paid in 2011, according to a report by the UN Secretary General from October 2011. In November 2011, another two pirates were reportedly released from prison in Berbera, Somaliland, after a bribe was paid.
Description: In order to ensure successful prosecutions, industry must cooperate with Law Enforcement to ensure access to and preservation of forensic evidence, ensure the reporting of all piracy attacks and incidents by private security teams, and facilitate access to crews to allow them to testify against pirates.
Assessment: The latest version of BMP includes a section to encourage crews to provide witness statements related to the crime, recommended best practices and protocols for the preservation of evidence or other physical clues and guidelines for ship owners to ensure the preservation of evidence on ships or the integrity of the crime scene. However, there are no standardized rules requiring the reporting of incidents at sea by private security teams, and there are still challenges associated with getting crew members to provide testimony: “In most of the States in which prosecutions have been initiated, the legal system is based on common law and requires testimony in person. That requirement is a major obstacle to a swift trial either because the victims do not wish to go to lengths to give evidence, are afraid, or their employers may not allow them to testify.”
Description: Somali maritime piracy has developed into a sophisticated business model with large-scale logistics networks to supply equipment to pirate gangs as well as ensuring that ransoms are distributed to the ‘investors’ based in Somalia and abroad. In order to effectively disrupt and dismantle the pirate business model, it is necessary to prosecute those who plan, finance and supply pirate operations. By targeting a smaller, more concentrated group of pirate leaders, the pirate enterprise is weakened more efficiently than through pursuit of “rank and file” or lower rung pirates who are more easily replaced.
Assessment: The US has indicted two suspected pirate negotiators. One was apprehended in Somalia (Puntland) and the other was arrested when he tried to enter the US. Working Group 5 of the CGPCS was established in July 2011 with the aim of coordinating international efforts to identify and disrupt the financial networks of pirate leaders and their financiers. However, there is still a list of known pirate leaders who have not been apprehended.
Description: Somali governance developed and strengthened to facilitate effective enforcement of laws, including amendeding domestic codes to officially prohibit and criminalize acts of piracy in accordance with international standards, as well as declaring an Exclusive Economic Zone for Somali waters according to UNCLOS to enable enforcement of Somali waters.
Assessment: Strong resistance in Puntland’s government against criminalizing piracy without including illegal fishing indicates that it will be a challenge to fully update Somali legal codes in accordance with international definitions. Somalia has “critically out of date criminal and procedural codes and a shortage of trained judges and other legal professionals,” according to the UN Security Council. The ‘Somalia End of Transistion’ roadmap includes the planned establishment of a Somali EEZ by the end of 2011 as well as enacting of anti-piracy legislation by May 2012.
Description: Under current international lawit is possible charge suspected pirates with the conspiracy to commit piracy based on the possession of piracy-related equipment and paraphernalia. Prosecuting suspected pirates on charges of conspiracy would enable the international community to incarcerate a much larger number of pirates than is currently the case.
Assessment: In the vast majority of cases, international naval forces have to release suspected pirates because of lack of political and/or prosecutorial will to prosecute based on conspiracy or equipment. Moreover, EU NAVFOR's Chief of Staff has disputed the ability to prosecute for conspiracy based on pirate paraphernalia by comparing it with imprisoning a law-abiding sports car driver because he has the capacity to speed. In addition, there is currently a lack of prison capacity in the region, further limiting the possibility of prosecuting suspected pirates who are not 'caught in the act'.
Description: The CGPCS offers participation to any country or international organization making a tangible contribution to the counter-piracy effort, or to any country significantly affected by piracy off the coast of Somalia. Other relevant stakeholders may participate in the meetings of CGPCS and its four Working Groups as observers.
Assessment: Although formed as a separate institution from the United Nations, the Contact Group still emphasizes state-centric leadership and membership focused on individual nations, regional organizations of nations, and international organizations. Other select stakeholders are offered observer status. There is also a perceived geographic imbalance with Europe and North America heavily represented in both overall membership and leadership positions.
The current long-term focus for the international community is to build capacity in Somalia to imprison pirates that are convicted in regional nations and to ensure fair and efficient prosecution and imprisonment of pirates in Somalia.
Description: Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Assessment: The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), along with Four Working Groups, was formed in January, 2009. The CGPCS works on a cycle of three meetings per year. In July, 2011, a sfifth Working Group was formed to address Piracy Financial Flows.
Description: It is imperative for relevant bodies to work together to develop a collective understanding of required action to streamline efforts and maximize effectiveness.
Assessment: Working Group 1, led by the UK, has established a needs and requirements matrix for regional capacity building, including from 2011 also operational capacity building through the Djibouti Code of Conduct and international navies. Working Group 2 has established a 'legal toolbox' containing checklists, guidelines, templates, and compilations of relevant legal documents relating to prosecution of suspected pirates. However, no overall matrix exists listing the initiatives and resources required to comprehensively address piracy.
Description: The Contact Group could strengthen overall efforts by providing proactive coordination and prioritization of initiatives and resources across various working groups.
Assessment: While the contact group has a mandate to “facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia” little effort has been focused on coordination of actions. The four (now five) Working Groups have largely run independently, with some of the working group efforts well ahead of others. Also, in part due to the short four month leadership role of the Plenary Chair, the efforts across working groups have not been de-conflicted to ensure unity of effort. The evidence of this lack of coordination and frustration has been expressed by several stakeholders, including the Strategy for the Danish Counter-Piracy Effort, which stated that “Despite the important work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), it seems that there is a continued need for enhanced coordination, in particular in relation to regional capacity building, which includes the coast guard sector. At this time, there is no single international strategy in place for combating piracy."
Description: The CGPCS offers participation to any country or international organization making a tangible contribution to the counter-piracy effort, or to any country significantly affected by piracy off the coast of Somalia. Other relevant stakeholders may participate in the meetings of CGPCS and its four Working Groups as observers.
Assessment: Although formed as a separate institution from the United Nations, the Contact Group still emphasizes state-centric leadership and membership focused on individual nations, regional organizations of nations, and international organizations. Other select stakeholders are offered observer status. There is also a perceived geographic imbalance with Europe and North America heavily represented in both overall membership and leadership positions.
The CGPCS has, in their communique of 14 July 2011 underlined the continued importance of close international co-ordination to address effectively the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the wider Indian Ocean.
Piracy Containment
Description: Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Assessment: The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), along with Four Working Groups, was formed in January, 2009. The CGPCS works on a cycle of three meetings per year. In July, 2011, a sfifth Working Group was formed to address Piracy Financial Flows.
Description: It is imperative for relevant bodies to work together to develop a collective understanding of required action to streamline efforts and maximize effectiveness.
Assessment: Working Group 1, led by the UK, has established a needs and requirements matrix for regional capacity building, including from 2011 also operational capacity building through the Djibouti Code of Conduct and international navies. Working Group 2 has established a 'legal toolbox' containing checklists, guidelines, templates, and compilations of relevant legal documents relating to prosecution of suspected pirates. However, no overall matrix exists listing the initiatives and resources required to comprehensively address piracy.
Description: In order to create a sustainable counter-piracy framework, leadership for regional maritime efforts must be developed from within the region iteself. Key areas include operational coordination of naval operations, information sharing and regional capacity building.
Assessment: The precondition for regional leadership is the successful de-confliction of regional intiatives. The second phase, which has not yet begun, could include the eventual transfer of the convening and coordination functions of existing, but western-led initiatives such as TRADE, SHADE, MSC-HoA, UKMTO and others to regional organizations.
Description: The Contact Group could strengthen overall efforts by providing proactive coordination and prioritization of initiatives and resources across various working groups.
Assessment: While the contact group has a mandate to “facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia” little effort has been focused on coordination of actions. The four (now five) Working Groups have largely run independently, with some of the working group efforts well ahead of others. Also, in part due to the short four month leadership role of the Plenary Chair, the efforts across working groups have not been de-conflicted to ensure unity of effort. The evidence of this lack of coordination and frustration has been expressed by several stakeholders, including the Strategy for the Danish Counter-Piracy Effort, which stated that “Despite the important work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), it seems that there is a continued need for enhanced coordination, in particular in relation to regional capacity building, which includes the coast guard sector. At this time, there is no single international strategy in place for combating piracy."
Description: Studies have shown that piracy costs the shipping and maritime industries billions of dollars every year. The vast majority of this expense is used on mitigation measures such as ship hardening, insurance, re-routing and private security teams. While not a traditional role for private companies, contributing to collective long-term solutions might lead to lower costs in the long run, as the root causes of piracy are treated and the need for mitigation measures decreases.
Assessment: By and large, industry has not contributed to the collective solutions that have been established to encourage their participation, such the Contact Group Trust Fund and other Trust Funds established by organizations such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct. There is some thought that industry could be further encouraged to contribute to collective solutions if they were allowed to participate more equally in the planning and decision-making process.
Description: The CGPCS offers participation to any country or international organization making a tangible contribution to the counter-piracy effort, or to any country significantly affected by piracy off the coast of Somalia. Other relevant stakeholders may participate in the meetings of CGPCS and its four Working Groups as observers.
Assessment: Although formed as a separate institution from the United Nations, the Contact Group still emphasizes state-centric leadership and membership focused on individual nations, regional organizations of nations, and international organizations. Other select stakeholders are offered observer status. There is also a perceived geographic imbalance with Europe and North America heavily represented in both overall membership and leadership positions.
The CGPCS has, in their communique of 14 July 2011 underlined the continued importance of close international co-ordination to address effectively the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the wider Indian Ocean.
