Towards a Regional Solution to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities

Jens Vestergaard Madsen and Liza Kane-Hartnett, Oceans Beyond Piracy
Abstract

Piracy has topped the international agenda since 2008, when Somali piracy resurfaced as a major threat to global shipping, humanitarian aid delivery, and the well-being of seafarers. The international community responded to this threat with crisis response operations in the form of naval patrols and convoys, privately contracted armed security personnel, and industry best management practices. In addition to crisis response operations, the international community has focused on building capacity in the Western Indian Ocean region with the aim of developing a long-term sustainable solution to piracy. This paper will analyze current international efforts to address piracy, and will propose a way ahead that focuses on leadership from local Somali authorities.
Introduction

Somali piracy has been on the forefront of the world’s agenda since it emerged in the mid-2000s. While many attempts have been made to solve this threat to international shipping, humanitarian aid delivery and the well-being of seafarers, a long-term sustainable solution has yet to be developed. The immediate response to Somalia-based piracy was international crisis response operations in the form of naval convoys and patrols, privately contracted armed security personnel, and industry best management practices. While this response by the international community has effectively mitigated the crisis at sea, it is recognized that it is not the basis for a long-term solution.

It is generally accepted that a long-term solution must come in the form of a two-pronged approach, dealing with the problem on both the sea and land. With the success of international crisis response operations at sea and positive developments on the ground in Somalia, the development of a comprehensive approach, which focuses on land, now seems attainable. Up to this point the international community has led the way not only in terms of mitigating the immediate threat, but also in addressing the development of regional institutions meant to serve as the foundation for a long-term solution. This paper will examine the efforts made by the international community, focusing on internationally-led ‘regional efforts’ such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct and MASE, and analyze their impact on a long-term sustainable solution. The paper will demonstrate that the most effective approach to the development of a sustainable solution stems from regional and local initiatives that are led, funded, and implemented by regional and local authorities. This paper will then seek to carve out a role for the international community that focuses on support and empowerment of local initiatives rather than the implementation of Western-style leadership and organizations.
Averting the Crisis at Sea- International Crisis Response Operations

Crisis response operations are a necessary reaction to immediate threats such piracy. They are an effective way to mitigate the immediate threat and prepare for the development and implementation of a sustainable long-term solution. In regards to Somali piracy, the crisis response operations have been tri-fold, with the use of naval patrols and convoys, privately contracted armed security personnel, and industry’s best management practices. In addition to crisis response at sea, the international community, in 2009, also established a forum, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), to coordinate the counter-piracy actions of stakeholders.¹

Although attacks by Somalia-based pirates had been reported since the early 1990s, it was not until the mid-2000s, when the number of attacks skyrocketed and the value of ransoms and length of captivity of seafarers increased dramatically, that the international community began paying attention to this threat to international merchant shipping, humanitarian aid delivery, and the well-being of seafarers. International crisis response operations began in earnest in 2008, when the UN Security Council, in quick succession adopted four resolutions specifically addressing Somali piracy.² In increasingly strong verbiage they called upon states and international organizations to ‘take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia’ through naval operations, legal arrangements, capacity-building support to regional countries, and increased international cooperation and coordination.³ Apart from the threat to global shipping and the well-being of seafarers, the UN’s initial response was in part due to pirate attacks on World Food

¹ The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, About Us, Background, http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?sessionid=9j8j1v0sGaO8123ljpNr9CzZfuacEn2x5j8HwijKnOhKntTX78qaxSfe1NxGRd1?action=background.
Programme vessels. The World Food Programme vessels, responsible for delivering food aid to Somalia and other impoverished nations, had been attacked six times between June 2005 and November 2007 by Somali pirates.⁴

The gravity associated with these repeated attacks on WFP vessels is seen in the mandate of the European Naval Force Operation Atalanta, the naval force charged with deterring, preventing, and repressing acts of piracy, which includes ‘protection of World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and the protection of African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipping’.⁵ The escorts of WFP and AMISOM vessels have proved effective as none of these ships has been attacked since. To further secure the waterways, in February 2009, international naval forces defined an area known as the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) to provide increased patrolling and monitoring, as well as group transits for merchant vessels.⁶ The international community recognized the success of naval operations and has continued to keep a constant naval presence in the Western Indian Ocean.

The crisis response operations also include the use of privately contracted armed security personnel and the implementation of industry’s best management practices. The use of privately contracted armed security personnel, or PCASP, while not publicly endorsed by industry in their best management practices, has proven very effective, as no ship with armed guards has been hijacked. Although discussions of the use of PCASP are often greeted with hesitation, their use is often viewed as a necessary evil due to their success. While effective, PCASP is expensive and operates in a complicated legal environment, making their use necessary in the short-term, but not ideal.

---


Often evaluated alongside PCASP is the implementation of industry’s best management practices, or BMP. Best Management Practices were developed by the shipping industry as a way to protect their ships, cargo, and seafarers when transiting the High Risk Area. Published in August 2011, version four is the most up to date version of the document which outlines the steps to take in order to reduce the occurrence of pirate attacks and to avoid being hijacked in case of an attack. BMP is built around three fundamental requirements: register with the EU-run Maritime Security Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), report to the UK Maritime Trade Operation (UKMTO), and implement ship protection measures. Ship protection measures vary from ship to ship, but often include: providing additional lookouts and enhancing their means of observation through better technology, using increased speeds in the High Risk Area, enhancing bridge protection, and physical barriers such as razor wire and water spray. While the Best Management Practices do not guarantee deterrence from a pirate attack, the use of these guidelines does greatly reduce the chances.

Apart from the multitude of efforts at sea, the crisis response operations provide support to governance as well. In 2009 the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established in response to United Nations Security Council resolution 1851 (2008), which encouraged:

‘all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism as the common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia’s coast.’

---


The CGPCS facilitates discussion and coordinates the actions of states and organizations working to combat piracy through five working groups. The GGPCS has been able to increase cooperation and is credited with contributing to the drop in attacks. With the continued decrease in attacks the CGPCS, in unison with the international community, has shifted its focus to capacity-building:

- The EU announced the approval of EUCAP NESTOR, a mission to ‘assist states in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, including Somalia, to develop a self-sustainable capacity to enhance their maritime security and governance, including judicial capacities’.  

- The International Maritime Organization (IMO) held a conference on capacity-building to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia where strategic capacity-building partnerships between IMO and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS); the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the World Food Programme (WFP); and the European External Action Service (EEAS) were announced.

- Working Group 1 of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) set up the Capacity-Building Coordination Group and developed an online capacity-building coordination platform for the coordination of judicial, penal and maritime capacity building activities in the Western Indian Ocean Region. The platform streamlines and coordinates

---

9 The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, About Us, Background, http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do;jsessionid=9jBj1vV0bsGaOB1231JpNr9CxZfuacEn2xSj8HwjKnOhKntTX7Bqax5fe1NgxGRd1?action=background.
11 “IMO signs strategic counter-piracy capacity building partnerships with UN agencies and EU,” http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/15-capacitiypartnerships.aspx.
needs submitted by beneficiary countries and Somali regions and the contributions being pledged to fill them.  

While this shift in focus demonstrates both the success of crisis response operations, and the desire to build capacity within the region, it also poses the question, what’s next? While the crisis response operations are effective and much of the accolades for the drop in piracy numbers are credited to these practices, they are also expensive. In 2011, naval operations cost the international community $1.27 billion, increased speeds $2.7 billion and security such as armed guards and ship hardening another $1.06 to $1.16 billion.  

The high costs, ninety-nine percent of which are recurring costs that do not address investment in a long-term solution, coupled with the decrease in attacks, have motivated the international community to seek a transition from crisis response to a sustainable long-term solution. The recent focus on capacity-building signals that there is an underlying expectation that it will lead to a sustainable end-state where the recipient, or beneficiary, will be able to perform the functions needed to secure their maritime domain with little or no external assistance. While a transfer to regional leadership is implied, the international community does little to demonstrate that it is comfortable with giving responsibility to Somalia and other regional countries. With this said, the international community is advocating a regional solution.  

On the surface this seems like a practical way to address a transnational problem such as piracy, however, the meaning of the word regional is vague and can mean many different things. What is clear, however, is the international community’s intention to create and lead said regional

14 “The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011 Summary.”
institution, while they should advise and support a solution that takes its departure in the self-defined needs and requirements of countries in the Western Indian Ocean Region. This paper will examine the internationally-led regional attempts made to curb piracy off the Horn of Africa, and propose a way ahead that focuses on successes of locally initiated solutions.

Internationally led “Regional Efforts”

While international crisis response operations such as naval patrols, the use of PCASP, and the implementation of BMP, have been effective in lowering the number of attacks, it is increasingly accepted that this is not a long-term solution. These efforts cost the international community billions of dollars each year and do not provide for Somalia and other regional nations to take over the responsibility for their own maritime domain. In an effort to move away from crisis response operations and rely more on regional governance, the international community has moved towards regional organizations as their solution of choice for Somali piracy. While the concept of a regional solution or strategy is relatively straightforward, the development, funding, and implementation rarely are, particularly in a region as complex as the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean.

When combatting transnational problems, such as piracy, regional organizations are an attractive solution. This is due to many factors, notably monetary concerns and the desire to shift responsibility to the region affected. While in theory, a regional institution is led and implemented by members of said institution, in practice this is not always the case. When it comes to combatting piracy in the Horn of Africa, regional efforts are rarely entirely regional, and more often are internationally funded, led, and implemented missions designed for European/Western standards; such is the case with many so-called regional responses to piracy, including both the Djibouti Code
of Conduct and the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean Regional Strategy, implemented through the EU-led program known as MASE.\textsuperscript{15}

The Djibouti Code of Conduct, or the Code of conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, is a great example of an internationally-led regional organization. The Djibouti Code of Conduct is a regional agreement, and the creation of the International Maritime Organization; it was adopted 29 January 2009. The agreement’s signatory states assert that they recognize the extent of the piracy problem and, “\textit{declare their intention to cooperate to the fullest possible extent, and in a manner consistent with international law, in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.”}\textsuperscript{16}

The stated actions of the agreement include: the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of piracy suspects, the interdiction and seizure of suspect ships and onboard property, the rescue of hostages, ships, and property subject to piracy, cooperation and coordination among signatory states and international navies, and a review of national legislation concerning piracy.\textsuperscript{17} On the surface, the Djibouti Code of Conduct looks fairly comprehensive and focused on the signatory states in the region, however in practice, it is a non-binding agreement funded predominantly by the international community and implemented by the IMO.

The Djibouti Code of Conduct was envisioned to replicate the success of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, ReCAAP, to


be discussed later, in the Western Indian Ocean region. However the regional composition and situation on the ground, such as lack of capacity and leadership, has meant that the de facto implementation and day-to-day management of the agreement is in the hands of an international body rather than a regionally designed, funded and implemented solution. From the outset, the Djibouti Code of Conduct has been an international project; the meeting was convened by the IMO, and the project is funded by the international community through the Djibouti Code of Conduct Trust Fund. The implementation responsibility also falls with the international community, which created a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) in 2010 to take the lead in implementing the agreement. The PIU works to improve regional capacity and enhance regional cooperation through four pillars: training, capacity-building, legal, and information sharing.\(^{18}\)

The framework of an internationally-led regional organization is not unique to the Djibouti Code of Conduct. With the lack of capacity in the region, the international community often takes the lead on transnational issues such as piracy. The ESA-IO Strategy, implemented under the programs Start-up MASE and MASE, is another example of a regional strategy that has been propped up by the international community; the MASE project is a product of the European Union and its partnership with the Indian Ocean Commission. The Eastern and Southern Africa- Indian Ocean Regional Strategy was adopted at a meeting in October 2010, however the MASE project began in earnest only in 2012 with Start-up MASE; an 18 month project designed to build the capacity required to “implement medium and long-term regional strategy against piracy and promote maritime security.”\(^{19}\) Start-up MASE was phased out in June 2013 as the MASE programme commenced. The project has a budget of 37 million EUR and will be implemented over a five year period by the


following four organizations: COMESA, the EAC, the IOC, and IGAD. With the project still in its infancy, it is difficult to judge the results; however we are able to critique the project and its role in the international community’s comprehensive approach to piracy.

The international community has developed and funded many organizations dedicated to combating piracy off the Horn of Africa; however several of these organizations are stuck in a tough transition phase. While the end goal is to turn responsibility over to the region, the proper capacity must be developed within the regional countries before this can happen. Due to this dire need for capacity to secure their own domain, many organizations are tasked with similar mandates to improve said capacity. These overlapping and non-regional projects often foster a sense of distrust within the region and fail to provide incentives for governments to take responsibility for their own security. Until a sufficient level of capacity is reached, or the region shows it has the leadership and funds to develop capacity themselves, the international community will have to keep playing a large role in combatting piracy and other transnational threats. The difficulty is to create programs that simultaneously build capacity, transfer and/or encourage regional governments and organizations to take on a larger responsibility, and achieve buy-in of the Somali people. Experience shows that this will only achieved through locally led initiatives that have the support of the international community.

With inadequate organic regional capacity to address maritime piracy, regional organizations funded and implemented by the international community seem to be the solution of choice. Therefore it is important to note the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. The regional organizations and agreements discussed above, while comprehensive in the scope of their goal,

---

often fail to successfully encourage countries to take on the task and responsibility of securing their maritime domain. The reasoning behind this is tri-fold:

1. The agreements are not legally binding;
2. There is a lack of capacity within the region for funding, leadership, and security; and
3. There is a gap in the cultural and political priorities and capabilities between the international community and the countries in the Western Indian Ocean region.

Perhaps the most significant issue with international attempts to prop up regional organizations lies in this gap between the predominantly Western international community, and the affected Western Indian Ocean nations. The international community often places politics above practicality when designing these regional agreements, opting to preserve their interests and goals above listening to and addressing the needs and priorities of the countries they are trying to help. Although there are many pitfalls to this approach, it can be argued that the internationally led effort has been able to kick-start better regional cooperation, coordination, and responsibility.

Regionally and Locally Led Initiatives

Although the international community has taken the lead on counter-piracy initiatives, experience tells us that a regional and/or locally planned initiative could prove more successful. In regards to regional governance, and piracy specifically, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, or ReCAAP, is the best example. ReCAAP was the “first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation
against piracy and armed robbery in Asia."\textsuperscript{21} The agreement, finalized in 2004, did not come into force until 4 September 2006.

Prior to Somalia becoming the world’s piracy hotspot, Southeast Asia held the dubious honor. In 2000, the IMB stated that Indonesian waters, followed by the Malacca Strait, were the most dangerous in the world.\textsuperscript{22} In response to a dramatic rise in piracy attacks and pressure from the international community, the governments of the region came together and developed the ReCAAP agreement to combat piracy in their waters. Unlike the Djibouti Code of Conduct, ReCAAP has been regionally ‘owned’ since its inception, which “gives the participating governments a sense of ownership that they would not be likely to have if they were not completely in charge.”\textsuperscript{23} This regional approach has allowed the nations affected the independence to design a plan based on their culture and priorities, keeping in mind their own interests and historical experiences with regional cooperation; instead of a program centered on western interests and value-systems, as is arguably the case in the Horn of Africa region.

ReCAAP’s success has demonstrated the ability and success of developing regions to build their own governance systems. Although Southeast Asia has more regional leadership and capacity than the Western Indian Ocean region, this has demonstrated the importance of buy-in and responsibility from participating states. When considering regional organizations for the Western Indian Ocean, the experience of ReCAAP where wealthy regional countries provide the funding and provide training and capacity-building to less developed contracting parties, should be a lesson. In the case

\textsuperscript{21} ReCAAP. About ReCAAP: Background Information About the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), and the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx.
of addressing Somali piracy for example, wealthy countries in the Middle East who also depend on safe and secure waters ought to consider taking on the type of leadership role that Japan and Singapore have played in combating maritime piracy in Asia.

While regional organizations often seek to address issues of governance on a large regional scale, local solutions begin at the source, in this case Somalia. For the first time in over twenty years Somalia has a functioning government that is recognized by the international community; it is widely recognized that a lasting solution to piracy must come from here. When looking at local solutions one must consider local in terms of local communities, but also local in terms of the national government and its impact on the communities of the nation. In the case of Somalia and piracy, this comes in the form of community action like the case of Eyl, and official government action, such as drafting a Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy.

Eyl is a great example of governance on the local level. Once known as a main pirate hub, Eyl successfully launched an anti-piracy campaign under the leadership of local traditional, religious, and business leaders, including female owners of small businesses. This focus on community action can only be developed from the coastal communities themselves, and has contributed to disillusionment with piracy in some communities such as Eyl where, “piracy has waned in both influence and its level of community support.”24 The coordinated effort between the Puntland government and Eyl’s community leaders once again demonstrates the impact of a locally grown solution and the importance of community buy-in. Eyl is not the only example of local initiatives demonstrating success, the case of Somaliland also shows the power of organic movements and governance. Somaliland, the autonomous region in the north, has developed its own government

---

and made it impossible for prospective pirates to conduct their business from its beaches, without
the support of the international community.

While community initiatives provide for immediate impact on the ground, a larger regulatory
scheme, similar to those constructed by Somaliland, must be put in place to increase economic
opportunity, and secure the maritime domain, if a sustainable solution to piracy is to be reached. It
is with this need that focus shifts to Somali Federal and Regional governments. Under the leadership
of the new Federal Government of Somalia, the Somali people will develop a strategy that is based
on their goals, needs, and priorities and aims to secure their maritime domain and resources.

The Way Ahead

With piracy numbers decreasing, international navy coalition mandates winding down at the
end of 2014, and the Federal Government of Somalia and Regional States coming together through
the Kampala Process to write a Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy, now is an ideal, and
urgent, opportunity to transition to a long-term sustainable solution.25 As previously shown,
experience demonstrates that the most successful and cost-effective solutions stem from local and
regional initiatives where the needs and priorities can be defined from within. This section will
discuss how to develop this framework and what role the international community should have in
helping to implement it.

I. Local/regional framework

The time has come to switch to a bottom-up approach when dealing with governance issues
such as piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean. For most local

25 United Nations Political Office for Somalia, Communique, “Mogadishu, 14 March 2013,” and
fileticket=Mfp0Vhla-dA%3d&tabid=11461&language=en-US.
communities and coastal towns, overarching agreements signed in London or Djibouti for that matter, have little to no effect on the ground. It is in these coastal communities, however, that the solution to piracy must be developed and implemented.

The example of Eyl, the coastal town that worked internally and with the Puntland government to eradicate piracy by denying the pirates access to supplies and shunning them from the community, provides support to this argument. Through engagement with local religious, traditional and business leaders as well as women’s groups, the regional government was able dramatically reduce the presence of pirates in the once pirate-hub;

“The Puntland government, with international backing, successfully engaged the Eyl community in an anti-piracy campaign designed to wield the influence of religious leaders, elders, businesses, and families to provide a united front against the piracy movement. Traditional and religious leaders used their moral authority to convince businesses to reject money of pirate origin, whether from the individual pirate himself or his family. And these families, under the strain of financial blacklists and weary of the violence and instability wrought by piracy, began to withdraw their support for the movement as well. Slowly, as the town became increasingly inhospitable to this form of criminal enterprise, pirates and their leaders began moving their operations elsewhere.”

This example demonstrates the effectiveness of locally led effort, and leads into the concept of the ink-spot approach, which advocates for developing and empowering communities of stability. This strategy was first applied by British colonial forces in the Malay rebellion during the 1950s, and has more recently been used in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This approach applied to Somalia would provide support to coastal communities attempting to push the pirates out. Dan Termansen, of the Royal Danish Navy supports this argument and states, “if the local population in the coastal regions can be influenced towards repelling —or at least not

---

26 http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/2012/07/30/turning-the-page-on-piracy-in-eyl/
supporting piracy, piracy will eventually be reduced.” This bottom-up approach cultivates stability on the ground, thus preparing for the implementation of over-arching schemes designed to develop governance.

While supporting local initiatives and building stability through the ink-spot strategy provides a basis for development, a permanent solution will only come when the Somali government has the ability secure its maritime domain and provide for its citizens in regards to both economic opportunity and security. It is with these larger issues that we turn to the Somali Federal and Regional authorities. As the Federal Government of Somali finds its footing, it will be tasked with greater responsibility to provide for its people, the groundwork for this is in development now. The Somali government has the opportunity, through the development of a Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy, to assess their own needs and priorities, and with the support of the international community can begin to develop the infrastructure required to secure their own domain.

II. Role for the International Community

To move ahead in a way conducive to Somali and ultimately the international community’s goals, the role of the international community must be reexamined and reshaped. As demonstrated in the previous section, the multitude of internationally-led efforts to develop a long-term sustainable solution to piracy has proven less effective than could be desired, and arguably have not delivered results commensurate with the investments made. If the international community wants to see success, they must alter their viewpoint, be prepared to take a back seat, and not expect a Western framework.

The international community’s role must transition from one of leadership, to one of support. It is time for them to take a step back, and begin to support Somali needs and priorities, as outlined in the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy. In their attempt to help eradicate Somali piracy, the international community should shift towards the ink-spot strategy discussed above. As Termansen argues, “by employing a top down approach on reconstruction, the current strategies oversee the opportunity to achieve an effect by influencing the root causes directly.”

Through the expansion of pockets of stability, the international community will be able to support the development of grassroots actions against piracy.

By addressing the root causes of piracy in the coastal communities, they can better affect the overall stabilization of Somalia, and further support the Federal and Regional governments. Their support to the Federal and Regional governments of Somalia should come in the form of support for local initiatives, technical expertise, and capacity-building. This focus will allow Somalia, with a great deal of assistance and support from the international community, to emphasize the rebuilding of their infrastructure and economy, while furthering a strategy to move forward in an inclusive and transparent manner. The international community will be able to exert greater influence through this coordinated method than possible when dictating a top-down approach based on Western value-systems.

Parallel to the redoubled efforts to support Somalia, the international community should maintain the momentum gained by the Capacity-Building Coordination Group under the auspices of WG1 of the CGPCS and the online platform as a tool to allow other regional countries to define and submit their capacity-building needs. The will bring greater transparency

---

29 Termansen, 16.
for both donors and beneficiaries, minimize the risk of duplicative efforts and thereby enhance the overall effect of capacity-building in the region, to the benefit of all.

Conclusion

Piracy is an age-old criminal enterprise that since 2008 has been at the forefront of the international community’s agenda. When Somali piracy began to pose large problems for the shipping industry, humanitarian food delivery, and the well-being of seafarers, the international community responded with crisis response operations in the form of naval patrols and convoys, privately contracted armed security personnel, and industry best management practices. In addition to these efforts at sea, the international community also developed governance by setting up the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which coordinates counter-piracy efforts through its five working groups.

The crisis response operations initiated by the international community had a positive effect on piracy, successfully mitigating the immediate threat. While large gains have been made, all progress is reversible, considering that no long-term sustainable solution has yet to be developed and implemented. Regional organizations seem to be the solution of choice for Somali piracy, however these organizations are often initiated, funded, and implemented by the international community, and fail to provide buy-in and address the root causes of piracy as well as Somali needs and priorities. While regional institutions can be effective if developed and implemented from within the region, i.e. ReCAAP, solutions are more successful when initiated at the local level. The examples of Eyl, and Somaliland demonstrate the success that can be achieved through locally led initiatives, and provide a framework for the international community to base their role.
To develop a long-term sustainable approach, the international community must transition their role to one of supporting and empowering. The international community should identify success stories such as Eyl and Somaliland and implement the ink-spot approach to grow the stability outwards. It is with this approach that responsibility will be transferred to the Somali people and government. It is only when the problem is their responsibility that they will ‘buy in’ and implement a comprehensive solution. To successfully transfer this responsibility, and for the international community to be in the proper position to support Somali initiatives, the international community must be ready to listen rather than lead. They have the resources and expertise to help the Somali people reach a sustainable long-term solution, but will not accomplish this if they are committed to dictating to the Somali people. Now that there is a Federal Government of Somalia, it is for them and the Regional States to assess their needs and priorities, and up to the international community, to give them the support they need.